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COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
THE INFORMATION AGE*
J. BECKWITH BURR**
I. INTRODUCTION
M ORE than twenty-five years ago, the Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Projects Agency undertook development
of an experimental computer network known as "ARPANet," the
technological embryo of what is now known as the Internet (the
"Net"). In time, the Net's "backbone"-interconnected, high-
power computers at government facilities-expanded to connect
users to a worldwide network supporting activities in government,
universities and industry labs. Today, we are all moving online to
participate in a revolution that will profoundly alter the way we de-
liver, access and use information. Millions of American adults are
connected directly to the Internet, and almost as many use com-
mercial online service providers like America Online, Compuserve,
and Prodigy. Anybody with a ten-year-old at home probably has a
clear idea of just how conservative actual estimates can be. And,
indeed, if there is consensus about anything in Washington, it is the
fact that the technological convergence of previously distinct tele-
communications, information and mass media industries now un-
derway will drive world economics as we move from the twentieth to
the twenty-first century.
The knowledge-based economy of the twenty-first century will
require the United States to develop a sophisticated and reliable
information infrastructure. Two realities will likely determine the
respective roles of the public and private sectors in our transition
into the information age. First, most Net users agree that the fed-
eral government should intervene only where the market is unlikely
to develop solutions that respond to critical collective needs. Sec-
ond, the federal government is not in a position to bank-roll cyber-
space development. For better or worse, the U.S. contribution to
*This Article is available at the Vilanova Law Review home page at http://
vls.law.vill.edu/academic/j d/journals/law-review/Volume_41/.
** Attorney-Advisor to Commissioner Christine A. Varney, Federal Trade
Commission; B.A., 1977, Yale University;J.D., 1987, Georgetown Law Center. The
views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of
the Federal Trade Commission, any Commissioner or staff.
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successful development of cyberspace depends on private
investment.
If we accept the need for private investment to develop the
National Information Infrastructure ("NII"), and if we have learned
anything from our experience in the telephone industry, competi-
tion is the name of the game. Promoting competition may be the
federal government's most important contribution to the NII, pro-
viding the best assurance that the benefits of rapid technological
change will be widely available and affordable. Robust competition
in an increasingly global, technology-based economy is an impor-
tant goal, but numerous challenges accompany its preservation.' It
is unlikely that any regulatory system affecting pricing, market en-
try, or product and service characteristics could have moved quickly
enough to keep up with the pace of change that we have seen in
this environment in recent years and are likely to see in the next
few years.2 Our goal, then, is to foster competitive conditions that
will lessen the need for legal intervention-including antitrust en-
forcement on the NII.
The regime that we select to protect intellectual property will
significantly affect the need for antitrust regulation and the
strength of competition on the NII. As we move online, care must
be exercised to protect electronic intellectual property to-but not
beyond-the extent necessary to promote the arts and sciences for
the benefit of the public. This is not to suggest that intellectual
property protection is unimportant. On the contrary, studies
demonstrate that over the years, social returns from intellectual
property protection have exceeded innovation returns that might
have occurred without that protection. Clearly, we should not abol-
ish patent and copyright protection. It is worthwhile, however, to
contemplate whether the balance we have struck in the past makes
sense in the context of emerging cyberspace technologies.
II. DETERMINING THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CYBERSPACE
For guidance (maybe inspiration is a better word) we might
return to the source of intellectual property protection in the
United States-Article I of the Constitution-which grants Con-
1. For a discussion of international enforcement of antitrust laws, see Joel
Klein & Preeta Bansal, International Antitrust Enforcement in the Computer Industry, 41
VnL. L. REv. 173 (1996).
2. See The Interminablenet, ECONOMIsT, Feb. 3, 1996, at 70 (noting that internet
activity is doubling every nine months).
[Vol. 41: p. 193
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gress the power "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."3
Some would read this (perhaps at their peril) to suggest that the
Founders did not view intellectual property as a natural "property"
right of any kind. Rather, the public is the primary beneficiary of
this provision; "ownership" is conferred upon creators only inciden-
tally, as a by-product of the process of promoting progress. Taking
this view, a cost/benefit analysis is required at every juncture. The
degree to which protection stimulates a producer and so benefits
the public must be weighed in each instance against the public det-
riment that necessarily flows from the market power conveyed by
intellectual property interests.
There are many stakeholders, representing very diverse intel-
lectual property interests, in cyberspace. Established content prov-
iders such as video and sound studios, broadcast producers and
publishers, are concerned -that the Net's decentralized nature
threatens their ability to control, and be compensated for, mass dis-
tribution. Individual artists worry that rapid technological change
makes it impossible to foresee the impact of licensing provisions in
the future. Some content providers devote enormous resources to
copyright clearance activities, while online service providers fear
that they will be held strictly liable for the infringement of subscrib-
ers who take their clearance obligations less seriously. Software
publishers complain that even if copyright law protects them in the
context of user-piracy (which they claim accounts for approximately
one-half of their product distribution in a given year4), courts are
increasingly unwilling to apply copyright sanctions to instances of
the "competitor piracy" that takes the form of nonliteral copying.
And as for creative users, even if they just want to have fun (as op-
posed to making money), it is not clear that the Fair Use Doctrine
supports the kind of multi-media collage-making that the technol-
ogy allows.
All of these interests-even those of the creative user-are le-
gitimate and, at some point, conflicting. Reconciling these inter-
ests in the context of changing technology is a formidable task, but
reconciled or not, these competing interests will directly affect the
rate of progress and the vitality of competition in cyberspace. Con-
tent owners may be reluctant to develop and to release intellectual
property into the electronic marketplace without assurances that
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
4. Piracy One of Many Software Issues, CoRp. LEGAL TIMES, June 1994, at 1.
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they will receive a return on their research and development
investment. Intellectual property clearance costs could remain pro-
hibitively expensive. System Operators ("Sysops"), facing uncon-
tainable liability, might look for ways to limit the content available
through their system by shutting down network access points. Well-
heeled software developers may (and currently do) look increas-
ingly to the patent system for protection which will, in turn, put the
hero of the 1980s-the software developer in the garage-on the
endangered species list (the continued existence of which is, itself,
a matter of some debate in Washington these days). Any of these
eventualities might erect barriers to new business entrants and raise
costs, and any increase in intellectual property protections gained
will have to be balanced against these types of social costs.
Intellectual property law and antitrust law are inextricably in-
tertwined, sharing the common goal of "encouraging innovation,
industry and competition."5 Inappropriate antitrust enforcement
may interfere with an intellectual property owner's ability to reap
the fruits of his or her invention, undermining not only intellectual
property law, but also the goals of the antitrust laws themselves. 6 By
the same token, inappropriate or overbroad grants of intellectual
property rights may interfere with the competition that often drives
innovation, 7 conflicting not only with the purposes of the antitrust
laws, but also with the purposes of the intellectual property laws
themselves. Likewise, overbroad protection of intellectual property
poses a threat to competition. Intellectual property protection that
goes beyond what is necessary to induce innovative effort may actu-
ally reduce innovation by other inventors who fear infringing on
the broadly patented interests by raising their costs and restricting
their activities and market access. Overbroad patent protection is
especially troublesome because, in the patent context, independ-
ent creation is not a defense.8 Hence, if patent protection is
granted to technology that represents nothing more than prior art,
5. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) (discussing patent and antitrust law as "complimentary" bodies of law).
6. This principle thoroughly conforms to the Antitrust Guidelinesfor the Licens-
ing of Inteectual Property, recently issued by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the Department of Justice. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (Apr. 6, 1995).
7. See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990).
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994) (listing defenses); see also Hughes Tool Co. v.
G.W. Murphy Indus., Inc., 491 F.2d 923, 927-28 (1973) (noting that independent
development is not defense).
[V61. 41: p. 193
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss1/4
1996] COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 197
competition may be impeded and industry efficiency may be dimin-
ished without providing any corresponding incentive to innovate.
Initially, operating and development costs increase when com-
petitors must structure their production around the protected
property. In some industries, innovation tends to be discrete and
directed at different goals. 9 A competitor can work on the develop-
ment of a new drug without worrying about infringing on patents
given to other drugs. Software technology, however, tends to be
cumulative and systematic, building on existing technology. 10
Moreover, new software must be compatible with older systems and
with the existing hardware base. Software innovators must, there-
fore, always be aware of the potential to infringe on existing intel-
lectual property rights. If a patent has been inappropriately
granted to prior art software, all would-be innovators in the field
must either find alternate technical solutions, or secure a license to
use the protected property. Moreover, network effects may sharply
limit the market for even superior technology to the extent that it is
incompatible with an installed base." The tendency to adopt de
facto standards means that a little bit of intellectual property pro-
tection goes a long way in a networked market.12
Additionally, uncertainty about what is and is not protected by
a particular patent increases when the boundariesof the patentee's
interest are ill-defined, and infringing liability is potentially expan-
9. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Pat-
ent Scope 90 COLUM. L. Rnv. 839, 902-04 (1990) (discussing chemical patents in
pharmaceutical industry).
10. Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative Systems Tech-
nology, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2674, 2675 (1994) (noting that software packages are
typically constructed using previously existing software programs and algorithms).
11. The historical pace of technological innovation in various industries char-
acterized by cumulative technology supports the theory that broad blocking pat-
ents may retard innovation and industry growth. For example, the early years of
the aircraft industry saw substantial patent litigation between the Wright brothers,
who held a patent for a stabilizing and steering system for aircraft, and potential
competitors who were unable to enter the industry without infringing on the pat-
ent. Merges & Nelson, supra note 9, at 890-91. The Secretary of the Navy finally
worked out an automatic cross-licensing system for various manufacturers during
World War I that enabled new competitors to enter the industry. Id. at 891. A
similar blocking patent was held by the Marconi interests in the radio industry.
After much litigation, the various manufacturers formed the Radio Corporation of
America to acquire the major patents in return for ownership in the corporation.
Id. at 893. Contrast these industries with semiconductors and computers, which
developed without blocking patents. In the latter two industries, technological
progress was rapid and less energy and resources were spent on litigation. Id. at84.
12. See generally Klein & Bansal, supra note 1 (discussing various approaches to
effective antitrust enforcement and their ramifications).
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sive.13 Increased uncertainty concerning infringing activities may
raise competitors' operating and developing costs. This increased
uncertainty is common to all intellectual property protection
13. The Compton's New Media patent is a well-known example of how an
inappropriate grant of protection points may harm. Fortunately, in this case, the
Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) invoked his powers
under § 303 to re-examine the patent for prior art claims. KarlJ. Kramer, Computer
Novelty: Can Software Be Patented?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 24, 1994, at S33; see 35 U.S.C.
§ 303(a) (1994) (providing that "[o]n his own initiative, and at any time, the Com-
missioner may determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is
raised by patents and publications discovered by him"). The PTO later rejected
the patent. James Evans, Patent Policies on Trial, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 1994, at D4.
Had this patent survived, the impact on future innovation in multimedia products
would have been substantial. Other manufacturers of software for multimedia
products would have faced reduced incentives to innovate, as certain key technol-
ogy would have been foreclosed to them absent a license to the retrieval technol-
ogy from Compton's.
The Compton's example underscores the necessity of granting protection
only for true innovation, but it is not the only such example. A similar blocking
patent has recently been challenged by firms that wish to compete with the patent
holder. Id. For example, a small San Diego firm received a patent for a process
that inserts advertising into software. Id. The firm is demanding royalties from
any other software firm that wishes to incorporate advertising into its products. Id.
Again, the Commissioner of the PTO has announced that this patent will be re-
examined. Id. Moreover, measures undertaken by the PTO to avoid grants of
overly-broad and obvious patents like Compton's have not proven effective to date.
As recently as July 18, 1995, for example, the PTO issued a patent on a software-
implemented method of teaching by superimposing a window containing the im-
age of an instructor of the educational material on-screen. See Patent No. 5433614.
According to the patentee, the "essence of the invention is the simultaneous dis-
play of the tutor's visage along with the material so as to create the sensation that
the student is being individually tutored in a non-threatening, conversational man-
ner." Id. The allowed claims appear to preclude unlicensed use of an on-screen
"talking head" in any educational software. The Interactive Media Association re-
ports that attorneys for the patentee have asked at least one interactive education
and training products developer to pay a substantial licensing fee for each media
type (e.g., CD-ROM, analog tape, laser disk, etc.) on which the technique appears,
along with a semi-annual royalty payment. While the PTO may decide to re-ex-
amine this patent, the educational software industry will likely experience in-
creased costs (in the form of attorney's fees and prior art searches) in the interim.
At an electronic multimedia trade show in 1993, Compton's New Media an-
nounced its then-recent receipt of a patent, applied for in 1989, that covered a
database search system that retrieves multimedia information consisting of text,
picture, audio and animated data. See Steven D. Glazer & Steven D. Kahn, Patent-
ing Software in the United States, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Feb. 1995, at 22.
Compton's claimed that its patent covered many of the products being shown at
the conference and demanded royalty payments. Id. Other manufacturers of mul-
timedia products claimed that the patent covered database searches and retrievals
that were in the prior art even in 1989, and therefore, should not be patentable.
Id. Such prior art is difficult to find: "Much of the prior art that the agency needs
to examine [in the Compton case], however, cannot be found in patents or schol-
arly publications, but is buried in the industry communications of software engi-
neers and in computer code. Unfortunately, patent examiners are not equipped
to search in the right places." Kramer, supra, at S33.
198
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schemes, but is especially acute where the technology at issue is cu-
mulative rather than discrete. 14
Overbroad intellectual property law might make it harder to
develop robust interoperability on the NII. Each component, such
as computers, wires, switches, televisions and satellites, will be built
by private concerns. Information must flow easily and accurately
across these components if the NII is to reach its potential as a
seamless web of networks and equipment. There is obviously a sig-
nificant public interest in a highly interoperable infrastructure.
First, each network's backbone of hardware and software that trans-
ports bundles of data has to communicate with any other local net-
work in cyberspace. Second, transported content should be
accessible for use in any number of applications. Some commenta-
tors have suggested that, under these circumstances, the transport
backbone of the Net will develop as a natural monopoly. Although
this is not a foregone conclusion, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), along with a number of other Federal agencies, will un-
doubtedly be watching infrastructure development closely. The
Clinton Administration has proposed a number of legislative incen-
tives for the creation of "open access" networks for the Net.15
Finally, defensive measures to reduce uncertainty about the
scope of a particular patent, such as purchasing licenses from the
patentee to guarantee noninfringement or developing one's own
portfolio of patents to use in cross-licensing arrangements, also may
lead to increased costs. Litigation may result either from the desire
of the patentee to protect its patents or from an innovator challeng-
ing those patents. 16 All of these responses to the inappropriate pat-
ent grant reduce economic efficiency by increasing both overhead
and production costs.
III. FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CYBERSPACE
Given the close connection between competition and intellec-
tual property protection, it is worth stepping back and asking what
is on the horizon for intellectual property protection in the infor-
14. In cumulative technology, the prior art in the public domain is more diffi-
cult to discover, a situation which is exacerbated here by the PTO's lack of an
adequate prior art database for software. See Nelson, supra note 10, it 2676.
15. See, e.g., Telecommunications Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (1996) (promoting competition and reduction of regulation).
16. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Hearings on Patent Protection for Software
Related Inventions, Jan. 26-27, 1994, at 17 [hereinafter Software Patent Hearings] (tes-
timony of Douglas Brotz, Adobe Sytems, Inc.) (concluding that "[a] 'patent litiga-
tion tax' is one impediment to our financial health that our industry can ill-
afford").
7
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mation industry. The issuance of the National Information Infra-
structure Task Force's ("NIITF's") White Paper,17 coupled with the
Patent and Trademark Office's recent issuance of examination
guidelines 8 that are expected to relax hurdles to receiving software
patents, suggests that we are moving to increased intellectual prop-
erty protections in the information industry. Before we adopt the
policies reflected in these two documents, we should seriously con-
sider whether increased intellectual property protection is neces-
sary to ensure adequate appropriability in this field, and what the
implications of this trend is for innovation and competition.
A. NI1TFs White Paper
The software industry was born and raised in the absence of
significant intellectual property protections. 19 Until quite recently,
we all assumed that patent protection was simply not available for
software. 20 Intellectual property protection is derived largely from
copyright and trade secret law. As courts gained experience with
the software industry, they became increasingly willing to draw the
idea/expression boundary at a point that facilitated interoperability
and competition through imitation and emulation.
At first blush, the White Paper appears to endorse continued
application of copyright law as currently interpreted by the courts.
A closer reading, however, with attention to the sort of pre-pack-
aged legislative history for the "modest" alterations it proposes,
reveals a slightly different story. First, the White Paper's analysis of
17. INFORMATION INFRASTRUCrURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, Sept. 1995, available at gopher://
ntiantl.ntia.doc.gov:70/00/papers/documents/files/iipii.txt [hereinafter WHITE
PAPER].
18. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478 (1996) [hereinafter PTO Guidelines].
19. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent
Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J.
1026, 1135 (1990) (noting that most protection for computer software has devel-
oped under traditional copyright protections without aid of patent law).
20. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594 (1978) (holding that only novel
feature of alarm system was mathematical formula or algorithm, which was not
patentable subject matter); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972) (hold-
ing that computer program not patentable process).
200 Vol. 41: p. 193
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the Fair Use Doctrine 21 threatens to severely circumscribe the avail-
ability of the fair use defense in the electronic age. 22
The White Paper implies that the purpose of fair use is to ex-
cuse copyright violations which occur only because reasonable li-
censing terms are unavailable or cumbersome to manage. In an
age of instant, electronic licensing and digitized copyright informa-
tion management systems, the report implies that the need for the
fair use defense should recede substantially.23 The White Paper
does not consider how important social values other than ap-
propriability, such as free speech, network interoperability and
broad dispersion of innovation for educational and noncommercial
exploitations, will be served in the absence of a robust fair use
exception.
The White Paper also proposes, and implementing legislation
has already been introduced in Congress,24 to clarify that digital
transmissions of copyrighted works constitute infringing distribu-
tions.23 In fact, this seems to be the current judicial view on digital
transmission. 26 Some commentators have speculated that a hidden
agenda underlies the proposal, perhaps a desire to ensure that digi-
tal browsing without a license is viewed as copyright infringement.
21. The Fair Use Doctrine provides that "certain uses of a copyright protected
work, which might otherwise be considered to be infringing, will be considered to
be 'fair' and shall not result in infringement liability." RICH-ARD RAYSMAN ET AL.,
MULTIMEDIA LAw: FoRMs & ANALYSIS § 5.08, at 5.28 (1995). What constitutes fair
use "is a fact specific, case-by-case determination." Id. The doctrine is implicated
"when a defendant claims that his or her use of the copyrighted work constitutes a
fair use rather than an infringement." MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, MODERN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 4.02[c] [1], at 4-40 (3d ed. 1995). The courts have enumerated four.
factors for determining what constitutes fair use: 1) "the purpose and character of
the use; ... 2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 3) the amount and substantial-
ity of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the
effect of the [defendant's] use on the potential market value of the copyrighted
work." DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183,
1188 (N.D. Tex. 1995). In 1976, the Fair Use Doctrine was codified in the U.S.
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) ("[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work
... is not an infringement of copyright.").
22. WHITE PAPER, supra note 17.
23. Id. at 73-84.
24. See S. 1122, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (providing greater copyright
protection by amending criminal copyright infringement provisions); S. 1284,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (applying copyright law to digital network environ-
ment of National Information Infrastructure).
25. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 17, at 165.
26. See, e.g., Sega Enter. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 1552, 1559 (N.D. Cal.
1994) (granting preliminary injunction and finding plaintiff likely to succeed in
showing infringement); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 679, 689 (M.D.
Fla. 1993) (holding that digitalized images transmitted by computer bulletin board
service directly infringed copyright).
9
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Finally, the White Paper proposes several legislative changes to
criminalize the import, manufacture or distribution of devices or
services "the primary purpose of which" is to circumvent copy pro-
tection technology,2 7 overturning the Supreme Court's ruling in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studies, Inc. (Sony Betamax)28 that
held it impermissible to prevent the distribution of technology with
a substantial non-infringing use.29 The shift in emphasis may be
subtle, but it dramatically alters the playing field by prohibiting dis-
tribution of technology that can be used both to infringe and to
facilitate the exercise of fair use rights when one decides that the
desire to infringe motivates such distribution.30
B. PTO Guidelines
Moving on to the PTO Guidelines, three legal doctrines to-
gether protect against overbroad patent protection for software to-
day: the subject matter test, the novelty test and the non-
obviousness test.3 1 The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) re-
cently adopted new examination guidelines3 2 ("PTO Guidelines")
governing internal decision-making on granting software patents by
establishing presumptions that certain implementations of com-
puter-based inventions constitute statutory subject matter.33 The
27. WHrrE PAPER, supra note 17, at 126.
28. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
29. Id. at 421.
30. It is worth noting, although this is not part of my current examination,
that the Copyright Management Information provisions of the proposed legisla-
tion would inevitably substantially undermine user privacy. WHrrE PAPER, supra
note 17, at 235.
31. See EPS-rIN, supra note 21, § 10.03.
32. PTO Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478 (1996).
33. Until quite recently, it has been assumed that software was patentable only
as an element of a traditionally patentable industrial processes, where patentees
sought to foreclose use of algorithms only in conjunction with all steps in a claimed
process. Samuelson, supra note 19, at 1096. Hence, the software patent debate has
turned largely on subject matter questions, and on the attempt to distinguish pre-
emptive claims on mathematical algorithms (which are not patentable) from inno-
vative implementations of mathematical algorithms that do not pre-empt use of
the algorithm itself (which are potentially patentable). Id.
The PTO Guidelines reduce the role of this initial distinction by instructing
patent examiners to presume that (1) programmed computers are statutory "ma-
chines," (2) program encoded memory devices (such as floppy discs) are statutory
"articles of manufacture" and (3) a sequence of steps implemented by code is a
statutory "process," all potentially eligible for patent protection under § 101 of the
Patent Act ("Act"). See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). Using these presumptions, patent
examiners are then instructed to review claims for adequate specificity under § 112
of the Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. Under the PTO Guidelines, operations performed
at the direction of software may serve as "specific acts" that correspond to an inven-
tion claimed using "means plus function" language. PTO Guidelines, supra note
10
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PTO Guidelines attempt to incorporate ambiguous recent Federal
Circuit case law3 4 into internal PTO decision-making on whether to
grant software patents by establishing presumptions that computer
implemented inventions constitute statutory subject matter.
These presumptions, in effect, ease the subject matter test,
which, in turn, puts greater pressure on the novelty and nonobvi-
ousness test to weed out inappropriate patents. In an ideal world, it
would be possible to determine with precision the novelty and non-
obviousness of a software invention. In such a world, patent protec-
tion might turn out to be an appropriate way to protect intellectual
property rights in software innovations.3 5 Currently, however, the
test for nonobviousness appears not to function well in the software
18, at 7483. If the Act's specificity requirements are met, examiners then deter-
mine whether a claimed invention meets the statutory requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness. Id.
34. Until 1994, the Federal Circuit interpreted existing case law to hold that
algorithms of the sort used in a general purpose digital computer are not patenta-
ble unless: (1) the application is limited to a specific special-purpose implement-
ing apparatus or (2) the claim describes a series of steps for manipulating specific
electronic signals. See, e.g., Arrhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that inventions directed solely to
abstract mathematical formulae or equations are nonstatutory subject matter); In
re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding fact that apparatus operates
according to algorithm does not make it nonstatutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1994)); In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding process not statutory
subject matter where all but one step was mathematical algorithm). While the
Federal Circuit's 1994 decision in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir.
1994), suggested that software may turn a general purpose computer into a special
purpose computer, subsequent Federal Circuit decisions do not reflect consensus
on this point. See, e.g., In re Trovato, 22 F.3d 290, 294-95 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding
that where mathematical algorithm is implicit, it is nonstatutory subject matter); In
reWarmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that patent covering
"bubble hierarchy" was patentable); In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579, 1584-85 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (concluding data structure limitations were patentable); In re Schrader, 42
F.3d 1376, 1381-83 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that mathematical algorithms de-
scribed in patent preamble are not patentable).
35. Note, however, that the subject of software patents is a matter of substan-
tial controversy within the computer industry and among practitioners and aca-
demics. See, e.g., Software Patent Hearings, supra note 16; Allen Newell, Response: The
Models Are Broken! The Models Are Broken!, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1023, 1026 (1986)
(arguing against patent protection of algorithms); Samuelson, supra note 19, at
1025-26 (same); Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2365 (1994) (proposing new
form of legal protection to replace inadequate system); Richard H. Stern, Solving
the Algorithm Conundrum: After 1994 in the Federal Circuit Patent Law Needs a Radical
Algorithmectomy, 22 AIPIA Q.J. 167, 170 (Spring 1994) (arguing that algorithms
"need and deserve intellectual property law protection"). But cf Donald S.
Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 959, 960 (1986) (arguing
that algorithms "should constitute subject matter eligible for patent protection");
Frederick R. Warren-Boulton, et al., Economics of Intellectual Property Protection for
Software: The Proper Role for Copyright, 3 STANDARD REviuw 1 (1995).
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area.36 Given continuing data and expertise problems, any expan-
sion of the scope of statutory subject matter will inevitably result in
the issuance of more patents that do not meet the statutory require-
ments of novelty and nonobviousness, but instead have the poten-
tial to block further software development. Given the non-public
nature of the patent application process, the absence of effective
post-award review and the substantial transaction costs associated
with defending patent infringement litigation, many improvidently
granted patents are likely to go unchallenged.
The PTO Guidelines also appear to increase liability for "inno-
cent infringement." Under current PTO practice, where software is
patentable only as a process, third-party software distributors in-
cluding retail software vendors, online service providers and hard-
ware retailers (so called "innocent infringers") are not directly
liable for patent infringement because they do not make, use or sell
36. The statutory requirement that a patent be nonobvious posits a gap be-
tween current technology and the innovation. The Supreme Court has enunci-
ated a three part test for nonobviousness: (1) the level of ordinary skill in the art
and the scope of the prior art must be determined; (2) the differences between the
prior art and the patent claims at issue must be ascertained; and (3) the obvi-
ousness of those differences to a person of ordinary skill must be decided. Gra-
ham v. John Deere Corp., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). Software innovation, however,
typically does not have such a gap. See Newell, supra note 35, at 1026 (concluding
that there is no gap in computer science); Samuelson, supra note 19, at 1110.
Software innovations are based on existing technology and tend to be marginal,
systematic and predictable.
The nonobviousness test further implies consensus as to who qualifies as a
"person of ordinary skill in the art," per the third requirement listed above. In
fact, there are few clear lines in the software industry, and programming encom-
passes a very broad range of skills. The nonobviousness test is further complicated
by the fact that software patents often claim business or educational methods
which need to be evaluated with respect to the state of the art in those fields as
well.
It can be difficult for examiners even to determine the state of the prior art
for any new software application. See Kramer, supra note 13, at S33. Because the
software industry largely grew without patent protection, many of the basic build-
ing blocks of the current state of the art have been in prior use for years, although
not in a manner susceptible to discovery by PTO examiners. The prior art is bur-
ied in computer code rather than published, and that which was developed and
used in the 1970s and 1980s, and which has been subsumed into current codes, no
longer exists. Id. The lack of an adequate prior art database and an inadequate
patent classification system in the computer software area makes it difficult for the
PTO to develop sufficient expertise in the granting of software patents. The Com-
missioner of the PTO has admitted that:
[in] improving quality of examination for our software-related inventions
... there are some inherent problems which are very difficult to address
... (including] that a lot of what is known in this area is in the area of
trade secrecy. It's not written down anyplace. It's not even in prior pat-
eni applications, and so we have a very difficult time sometimes making
determinations.
Software Patent Hearings, supra note 16, at 2.
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the patented process. They can be held liable by patentees only if
they are shown to have "culpable knowledge" of the infringement.
Because the PTO Guidelines will provide patent protection for en-
coded floppy discs,37 third-party software and hardware distributors
will become strictly liable for direct infringement. This reverses lia-
bility allocations deliberately established by Congress in 1952.38 As
a result, software distributors will face greater risks of infringing on
protected property, and the higher compliance and litigation costs
associated with these greater risks.
IV. CONCLUSION
The risk of granting overbroad intellectual property protection
might conceivably be acceptable if the alternative was a stagnant
software industry. That does not seem to be a likely outcome, how-
ever, of retaining, at least for the present, the status quo on intellec-
tual property protection for software. The current mix of patent
and copyright protection available for software is recent, but ap-
pears to have been successful in encouraging substantial innova-
tion. Instead, the software industry is large and rapidly growing,3 9
and U.S. software companies hold substantial technological and
market advantages over foreign competitors. 4° It is unclear from
the available evidence that any market failure has occurred, or that
expanded patent protection is necessary to cure such failure. Addi-
tional protection, therefore, may be unnecessary or perhaps even
counterproductive. 41 Inappropriate or defective grants of patents
to protect software innovation may contain serious risks of overpro-
37. Under the PTO Guidelines, encoded memory devices such as floppy discs
are presumed to constitute statutory "articles of manufacture." PTO Guidelines,
supra note 18, at 44.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994); see Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S.
422, 525-27 (1963) (Black, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative history of § 271 of
Patent Act).
39. A spokesman for Intellectual Property Owners, Inc. stated that, in 1992,
sales for controlling software for non-computer uses "by many estimates well-ex-
ceeds one hundred billion dollars a year," while sales of packaged software for
computers adds another 17 billion dollars a year to that total. Software Patent Hear-
ings, supra note 16, at 6 (testimony of William Ryan, Intellectual Property Owners,
Inc.).
40. "The US software industry... is the fastest growing industry in this coun-
try by any rational measurement .... The growth has been fueled by strong export
performance by US companies; 75% of the world's sales of pre-packaged software
comes from US software companies." Software Patent Hearings, supra note 16, at 66
(testimony of William Neukom, Vice President, Microsoft Corporation).
41. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 2675 (noting that over-protection will dis-
courage production and creativity).
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tecting software to the detriment of competition, consumers and
current and future software innovators.
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